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JUDICIAL LINE-DRAWING AND THE COURT’S FAILURE TO PROTECT
IMMIGRANTS
Zoe Graham *
“Resisting violence and abuse by the state is
especially difficult when those in power exercise
their ability to legally define an institution such as
immigration detention in ways that shield it from
legal challenge.”
– Carl Lindskoog 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nativism, xenophobia, and “law and order” politics have
worked in tandem to systematically deny undocumented
immigrants—particularly immigrants of color—their constitutional
rights to due process before being subjected to detention and
removal. The Supreme Court has perpetuated this inequality by
creating an exception to constitutional protections known as “entry
fiction.” The Court has repeatedly used entry fiction as a mechanism
to strip itself of jurisdiction to review immigration decisions and
give complete judicial deference where it should not. Since its
judicially created inception, the entry fiction doctrine has been
weaponized against undocumented immigrants and refugees by all
three branches of the United States government. The Court has
failed to uphold the Constitution by categorically treating
undocumented immigrants as less-than and turning a blind eye to
the abrogation of basic constitutional protections.
This article analyzes the use of entry jurisprudence and
discusses the future of entry fiction and immigration exceptionalism
in light of the Court’s recent opinion, Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam. 2

2

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
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II. BACKGROUND
The following section gives a broad overview of relevant
immigration law and explains the basic premise of entry fiction and
how it applies to certain groups of immigrants.
It is not entirely clear what the Founding Fathers would have
thought about the immigration system as we now know it. Many of
the Founding Fathers were immigrants themselves; both George
Washington and Thomas Jefferson wrote that they thought of the
United States as a place for refugees. 3 However, it is important to
note that their idea of a “refugee” may have differed drastically from
our contemporary understandings. 4 In fact, it is unlikely that many
of today’s refugees would have been entitled to basic civil rights
under the original Constitution at all. 5
Less than two decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court issued an expansive interpretation
and declared that all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, including undocumented immigrants, were entitled

3

See Stuart Anderson, Immigration, Nationalism and America’s
Founders, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/08/01/immigrationnationalism-and-americas-founders/?sh=48868e4236c1; Letter from George
Washington to Francis Adrian Van Der Kemp (May 28, 1788), in Founders
Online, NAT’L HIST. PUB. & REC. COMM’N,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-06-02-0266
[https://perma.cc/RJ86-3Z4M]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Flower
(Sept. 12, 1817), in Founders Online, NAT’L HIST. PUB. & REC. COMM’N,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-12-02-0012
[https://perma.cc/M6K8-JXLL].
4
Anderson, supra note 3 (Jefferson referred to people “fleeing the
misrule of Europe” as “refugees”) (emphasis added).
5
See Paul Finkelman, “Let it be Placed Among the Abominations!”:
The Bill of Rights and the Fugitive Slave Laws, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/the-bill-of-rights-and-the-fugitive-slavelaws.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S.
Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-simmigrants/.
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to due process and equal protections of the law. 6 Continuing with
such inclusive interpretations, the Court subsequently extended the
protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to all persons within
the territory of the United States. 7 However, these protections were
never fully realized and continued to erode in the mid-1950s with
the introduction of entry fiction.
There are two ways for an immigrant to become
“undocumented” in the United States. The first is unauthorized
border crossing, which is what comes to mind for a majority of
laypeople when they think about “illegal” immigration. Contrary to
public belief, the majority of newly undocumented immigrants over
the past decade were not “illegal” border crossers.8 Instead, the most
common way for immigrants to become undocumented has been by
overstaying their visas or failing to follow through with extensions
or other administrative paperwork. 9 For each year of the past four
years, it is estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 lawfully
admitted visa holders overstayed the terms of their visas and
become undocumented. 10 Understanding how immigrants become
6

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment has broad application and must be extended to protect
all persons within the borders of the country) (emphasis added).
7
Wing Wong v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
8
See Robert Warren, U.S. Undocumented Population Continued to
Fall from 2016 to 2017, and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal
Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive Year, CTR. FOR MIGRATION ST. (Jan. 16,
2019), https://cmsny.org/publications/essay-2017-undocumented-and-overstays/
[https://perma.cc/PA8R-EWTQ].
9
Id.
10
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENTRY/EXIT
OVERSTAY REPORT 13 (2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0513_fy19-entry-andexit-overstay-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCN7-R9FD]; U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 13
(2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MDB-9P92]; U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2017 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 12
(2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_1009_S1_EntryExit-Overstay_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2TV-WSDF]; U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2016 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 13
(2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Entry%20and%20Exit%20
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undocumented is essential for understanding Supreme Court
jurisprudence and the entry fiction doctrine. For the sake of clarity,
I will refer to the sub-category of undocumented immigrants who
enter via unauthorized border crossing as “unentered immigrants.”
Prior to the creation of entry fiction, it was understood that
physical entry and legal entry were one in the same. 11 Once an
immigrant had physically entered the country, whether by visa or
by border crossing, the immigrant was considered to have “entered”
the country in the legal sense and was therefore entitled to
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The Supreme Court
altered this understanding by separating physical entry from legal
entry. 13 Legal entry began to require lawful admission at a port of
entry. 14 In 1996, Congress officially codified the entry fiction
doctrine through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). 15

Overstay%20Report%2C%20Fiscal%20Year%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWV2-7GDM]. Between 90,000 and 150,000 of the
individuals who overstayed entered the United States on the Visa Waiver
Program (“VWP”). The VWP allows travelers from thirty nine countries to
enter the United States for business and travel purposes without having to apply
for visas. The countries represented in this program are exclusively considered
the “global north” (e.g., European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). These individuals can effectuate an
“entry” simply by passing through U.S. Customs. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., VISA WAIVER PROGRAM,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiverprogram.html [https://perma.cc/WWY3-KXD3] (last visited April 10, 2021).
11
In earlier versions of the Code, the legal definition of an “entry” into
the United States required: “(1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States, i.e., physical presence; (2)(a) inspection and admission by an
immigration officer, OR (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the
nearest inspection point.” See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(1988).
12
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Wong, 163 U.S.
at 238.
13
See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953). See also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1958).
14
Id.
15
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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This new legal fiction essentially split undocumented
immigrants into two categories based on their method of entry. 16
Undocumented immigrants who overstay their visas are still entitled
to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they have
physically and legally entered the country. But undocumented
immigrants who enter via unauthorized border crossing are now
stripped of these protections and considered the legal equivalent of
someone stopped and turned away at the border, despite being
within the country. This legal fiction disproportionately strips
constitutional protections from poor immigrants of color who do not
have the resources to obtain legal entry documents and are not
entitled to the Visa Waiver Program because they are from the
“global south.” 17
III. ENTRY FICTION’S BEGINNINGS: THE JUDICIARY
The beginning of the Cold War marked a turning point in
United States immigration law. The Supreme Court handed down
two decisions in the early 1950s that officially adopted the entry
fiction exception to due process protections. 18 These two cases set
the tone for future curtailment of immigrant rights.
The first of these cases involved a woman named Ellen
Knauff—a German-born immigrant seeking American citizenship.
16

Id.
It is important to note that immigrants who resort to unauthorized
border crossing are disproportionately poor immigrants of color. A number of
factors contribute to this disparity, such as inaccessibility to resources required
for visa applications, lack of legal assistance, and the United States creating visa
programs that explicitly benefit the “global north.” (I dislike the terms “global
north” and “global south,” but I use them for brevity and clarity. As of 2021, the
“global north” is most of Europe, Canada, the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. The “global south”
consists of the remaining “developing” areas, including Africa, the Middle East,
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Pacific Islands.) See North and South, The
(Global), ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/north-and-south-global
[https://perma.cc/G4XJ-2KMF] (last visited May 21, 2021). See also supra,
notes 8–10.
18
See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950); Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210.
17
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In 1948, Knauff petitioned the United States for naturalization and
was temporarily detained at Ellis Island. 19 The attorney general
denied Knauff’s naturalization petition the same day and
permanently excluded her from the United States without a
hearing. 20 The authority for the executive branch to deny her
petition without due process came from the Act of June 21, 1941,
which authorized the President to impose additional restrictions and
prohibitions on immigration during a national emergency. 21 Under
this power, the President issued Proclamation 2523, which granted
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General authority to prohibit
any alien from entering the United States if entry would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States. 22
Knauff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the 1941 Act as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. 23 The Court rejected this argument and tied its
own hands, stating that when Congress passes legislation
concerning the admissibility of aliens, it also implements an
inherent executive power which allows the executive branch to
decide alien admissibility with final and conclusive authority. 24
When analyzing whether this violated Knauff’s due process rights,
the Court stated that “whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.” 25 This means that unentered immigrants are not entitled
to any constitutional protections besides what Congress designates
to them.
Three years after Knauff, the Court issued another opinion
directly addressing immigrant rights. 26 In Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, the Court continued to set the groundwork for
the entry fiction doctrine by holding that “aliens on the threshold of
initial entry stand[] on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure
19

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
Id. at 539–40.
21
Id. at 540.
22
Id. at 540–41.
23
Id. at 542.
24
Id. at 542–43.
25
Id. at 543–44.
26
See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207
20

(1953).
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authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned.’ ” 27
The Court paints these issues as black and white, but
Mezei’s situation was certainly not. Mezei was not an alien on his
maiden voyage to America who could justifiably be turned away at
the border. 28 Mezei was returning to America after living here for
over twenty-five years. 29 It is troubling how the Court
oversimplified this case through its unwillingness to give any
credence to the fact that Mezei had previously been legally admitted
to the United States and had spent twenty-five years building a life
here.
Even more troubling, Mezei’s situation was unique because
the United States had nowhere to deport him. 30 He was unable to
secure entry into any other country, so this ruling ultimately meant
that he could be indefinitely detained and had no constitutional right
to challenge it. 31
Throughout both of these cases, the Court expresses a
disinterest in intervening on behalf of immigrants. The Court
effectively tied its own hands by attempting to strip itself of the
power to review immigration decisions and granting Congress and
the Executive complete discretion to decide who should and should
not be protected by the Constitution. In both cases, the Court stated
that the power to expel or exclude aliens is “a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.” 32

27

Id. at 213. See also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188–89

(1958).
28

See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
See id.
30
Id. at 209.
31
Id. at 209–10.
32
Id. at 210 (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 539 (1950)) (emphasis added).
29
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IV. ENTRY FICTION’S EXPANSION: THE EXECUTIVE
Shortly after the Court declared the validity of the entry
fiction exception, the United States began to see large influxes of
migrants fleeing oppressive regimes in the Caribbean and Central
America. 33 Unlike the European and Euro-Cuban refugees of
previous decades, these new waves of immigrants were
predominantly poor people of color. 34 The growing concerns
surrounding race coupled with xenophobia and political pressure
from local communities pushed the United States government to
adopt punitive and discriminatory immigrant detention and parole
policies which were largely informed by the idea of entry fiction.
In response to the masses of immigrants arriving on South
Florida shores, Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”) 35
implemented policies to detain all incoming refugees and expedite
their expulsion from the country. 36 A number of class action
lawsuits bubbled up through the Florida district courts challenging
the constitutionality of these policies and procedures. 37 Haitian and
Cuban activists brought attention to the dismal conditions of the

33

See Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 34 (“Approximately 15,000 Haitian
asylum seekers joined the more than 100,000 Cubans who arrived in the spring
and summer of 1980, placing the United States in the unprecedented position of
being a country of mass first asylum and presenting the Carter administration
with a refugee crisis for which it was unprepared”).
34
Id. at 39.
35
INS was an executive agency within the U.S. Department of Justice
that oversaw immigration law, enforcement, and border patrol. After the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, INS’ functions were
divided between three new entities – U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP). See Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (last visited May 3, 2021),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/F85E-PG2N].
36
See Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 27. Some of these policies included
a blanket denial of Haitian asylum petitions and increasing the number of
expulsion hearings per day to speed up the removal process.
37
See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (confirming that INS’s policies constituted discrimination against Haitian
refugees); Fernandez-Roque, et al., v. Smith, et al., 600 F. Supp. 1500 (1985).

104

overcrowded jails and makeshift refugee detention centers which
forced the Carter Administration to come up with a solution. 38
As a result, INS began paroling Cubans and Haitians into
the country via the Attorney General’s Parole Authority with the
explicit disclaimer that they were to be considered “entrants,” not
refugees, despite the fact that many of them had credible
persecution fears. 39 The designation as “entrants” allowed INS
officials to use entry fiction to maintain that those paroled had not
yet legally “entered” the United States. 40 This meant that INS could
eventually exclude the parolees as opposed to deport them,
effectively stripping them of their due process rights to challenge
future detention and removal. 41

38

See Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 44–45.
At the time, the Attorney General had the authority to parole
immigrants into the country in cases of humanitarian crisis or emergency. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414-477, § 204, 66 Stat.
181, 188 (1952). See also Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 19, 48, 111 (describing
how many of the Haitian “entrants” who were subsequently deported were
immediately subjected to prison, torture, or execution in Haiti).
40
See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214 (“the Attorney General may lawfully
exclude [an entrant] without a hearing”). See also Lindskoog, supra note 1, at
40 (citing Jana K. Lipman, “The Fish Trusts the Water, and It Is in the Water
That It Is Cooked”: The Caribbean Origins of the Krome Detention Center, 115
RADICAL HIST. REV. 123 (2013)).
41
Id. See also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra note 38,
at §§ 237, 242.
39
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V. ENTRY FICTION’S CODIFICATION: THE LEGISLATIVE
In addition to the influxes of new immigrants, the latter half
of the twentieth century was also characterized by civil and political
unrest. Hundreds of race riots broke out in urban cities across the
United States, including the then most destructive Watts riots in Los
Angeles and Martin Luther King Jr. assassination riots that took
place in over 100 cities. 42 Throughout this period, Americans all
over the country were consumed by news of the violence, disorder,
and destruction unfolding in urban centers. 43 Politicians stoked this
fear in rural and suburban white communities, and soon “law and
order” and “tough on crime” campaigns garnered wide support from
both major political parties. 44
Immigration law got swept up in this crackdown on crime,
in effect bringing about the criminalization of immigration law and
producing what some legal scholars have dubbed “the

42
See Thomas J. Sugrue, 2020 is not 1968: To Understand Today’s
Protests, You Must Look Further Back, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (June 11,
2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/2020-not-1968
[https://perma.cc/N6JW-JVX2]; Erin Blakemore, Why People Rioted After
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Assassination, THE HISTORY CHANNEL (last updated
Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/mlk-assassination-riotsoccupation [https://perma.cc/TXY3-7HLD]; Los Angeles Times Staff, How the
L.A. Times Covered the 1965 Watts Riots, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
https://documents.latimes.com/1965-watts-riots/ [https://perma.cc/22AULBXA] (last visited May 1, 2021). The Watts and Martin Luther King Jr.
Assassination riots have been surpassed as the most “destructive” by the 1992
Rodney King riots and 2020 George Floyd riots. See Noah Manskar, Riots
Following George Floyd’s Death May Cost Insurance Companies up to $2B,
THE NY POST (Sept. 16, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/09/16/riots-followinggeorge-floyds-death-could-cost-up-to-2b/ [https://perma.cc/25NM-GUH7].
43
See Los Angeles Times Staff, How the L.A. Times Covered the 1965
Watts Riots, LOS ANGELES TIMES, https://documents.latimes.com/1965-wattsriots/ [https://perma.cc/M6C8-GSM4] (last visited May 1, 2021); see also
Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 55 (“the national media closely covered the
violence, property destruction, and disorder of the previous decade’s urban
rebellions. For many present or watching on television, the scenes looked eerily
like a war zone”).
44
See Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 132.
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crimmigration crisis.” 45 One of the policies passed during this
period was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). 46 The purpose of the
IIRIRA was to codify the punitive policies of the prior decade which
were used to act as deterrents for future migration and to streamline
the removal of unentered immigrants. 47 Some of the most notable
components of the IIRIRA included: increasing border security,
restricting benefits previously available to undocumented
immigrants, streamlining deportation proceedings by limiting the
appeals process, creating penalties for unauthorized entry, and
expanding the definition of aggravated felonies and applying them
retroactively to disqualify lawful permanent residents from
maintaining their status. 48
Additionally, the IIRIRA narrowed the legal definition of
admission to include only a lawful entry (i.e., with a visa) after being
inspected or authorized by an immigration officer and codified the
entry fiction exception by creating two distinct categories of

45

Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 376 (2006) (discussing how the
intersection of nativism and the ostensible anti-crime movement helped push
immigration towards criminal law).
46
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in sections of 8
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON
STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 220 (Princeton University
Press, Feb. 16, 2016) (“support for tougher immigration policies had been
whipped up by charges that immigrants are a major source of crime and that
border violence is out of control. These twin tendencies produced both the
strikingly punitive turn in immigration policy and the continuing rise of the
carceral state”).
47
While advocating for tough immigration policy before a
Congressional subcommittee, Associate Attorney General Rudy Giuliani
testified that the implementation of punitive mandatory detention and
interdiction programs resulted in the Haitian immigration rate dropping to “just
about zero” from 1,500-1,600 per month. See Detention of Aliens in Bureau of
Prison Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, C.L., and the
Admin. of Just. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 18 (1982) (statement
of United States Assoc. Att’y Gen. Rudolph Giuliani).
48
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in sections of 8
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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immigrants, each with their own removal procedure. 49 The first
category is lawful permanent residents or other immigrants lawfully
admitted into the United States. This group can be deported after
receiving due process of law and a deportation hearing. 50 The
second category of immigrants are those traditionally subject to the
entry fiction doctrine which includes any “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .
[)].” 51 This group can be excluded or removed via an expedited
removal process which can be ordered and effectuated by an
immigration officer without further hearing or review. 52 This
expedited removal process often takes place entirely outside of
immigration courts and has been deformalized over the last few
decades to allow for more efficient expulsions without any judicial
oversight. 53
The law concerning inadmissible aliens and applicants for
admission continues to be excessively punitive. For example, if an
inadmissible immigrant claims asylum and substantiates a credible
fear of persecution, that asylum seeker is subject to mandatory
detention pending a final determination, which can take years. 54
Mandatory detention acts as a deterrent and results in many
immigrants voluntarily self-deporting themselves to escape the
miserable conditions of prolonged and uncertain immigrant
detention. 55 In addition to mandating detention and curtailing due
49

8 C.F.R. § 235 (2012); see also Applying for Admission into United
States, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/applying-admission-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/7XD2-CJPY] (last visited April 20, 2021).
50
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2020).
51
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2020).
52
8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2020) (emphasis added). Immigrants can
indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution before their
ordered removal.
53
See Allison Siskin & Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens (The Library of
Congress, 2005).
54
8. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii-iii) (2020).
55
In 2018 alone, nearly 30,000 immigrants applied for self-deportation,
opting to leave the country rather than being stuck in prolonged detention while
fighting a lengthy legal battle with very little hope of success. See Christie
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process protections for unentered immigrants, the IIRIRA also
sought to preclude any form of judicial review of executive actions.
Under section 1252(e), Congress severely limited the
Court’s jurisdiction to review executive decisions on unentered
immigrants. 56 Judicial review of any determination in habeas corpus
proceedings shall be limited to determinations of:
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed
under such section, and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, has been admitted as a
refugee under section 1157 of this title, or has
been granted asylum . . . . 57
The Court is not allowed to review whether the alien is
actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal. 58 In
conjunction with the Court’s general predisposition to defer to the
legislature and overall reluctance to review executive decisions,
these jurisdiction stripping statutes have caused immigration law to
severely lag behind all other areas of law. This immigration
exceptionalism has resulted in the abrogation of fundamental
constitutional rights, and this troubling trend does not seem to be
slowing down anytime soon.

Thompson & Andrew R. Calderon, More Immigrants are Giving up Court
Fights and Leaving the U.S., THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 8, 2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/05/08/more-detained-immigrants-aregiving-up-court-fights-and-leaving-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/S3R8-85XY].
56
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2020).
57
Id. (quotations omitted).
58
Id. at § 1252(e)(5) (2020).
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VI. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND
The Court has issued several important immigration
decisions in the last two decades. However, every time there is a
slight push towards increasing unentered immigrants’ rights, it
seems that the Court digs in its heels and entrenches itself deeper
into entry fiction and unjustified deference.
A. Zadvydas v. Davis
In 2001, the Court reaffirmed that admitted aliens were
entitled to constitutional protections but did not intend to address
the detention of unentered aliens, stating that “aliens who have not
yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very
different question.” 59 Despite not rendering a ruling on unentered
aliens, the Court continued to validate the entry fiction exception.
However, the Court’s use of case law to justify entry fiction, which
is riddled with inconsistency, only added to the confusion of who is
entitled to due process protections.
The Court stated, “[t]he distinction between an alien who
has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never
entered runs throughout immigration law.” 60 However, the Court
goes on to state that “aliens who have once passed through our gates,
even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming
to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
law.” 61 These two statements directly contradict each other. Under
the first, an unentered immigrant would not be entitled to due
process protections; but under the second, they would. The Court
fails to reconcile these contradictions and concludes with the broad
statement that due process protections may vary depending upon
59

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
Id. at 693 (emphasis added) (first citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S.
228, 230 (1925) (despite nine years‘ presence in the United States, an
“excluded” alien “was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained
no foothold in the United States”); then citing Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357
U.S. 185, 188-190 (1958) (alien “paroled” into the United States pending
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Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
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status and circumstance, despite citing cases directly above that
disagree with that notion. 62
Another problematic holding in Zadvydas is the Court’s
misplaced presumption that the immigration detention system is
“nonpunitive,” based solely on the fact that the proceedings are
labeled “civil.” 63 Government detention violates the Due Process
Clause unless it is used in a criminal proceeding where the
defendant was entitled to adequate procedural protections or in
“certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a
special justification outweighs the individuals constitutionally
protected interest.” 64 The Court skipped the analysis of whether
immigration proceedings are “narrow and nonpunitive,” concluding
that because they are “civil,” they are presumably nonpunitive in
purpose and effect. 65
This conclusion is misguided and ignores the historical
context and current state of immigration detention. The United
States has openly used punitive immigration policies to deter others
from migrating. 66 Yet, in Kansas v. Hendricks, a case cited in
Zadvydas, the Court acknowledged that deterrence is one of two
primary objectives of criminal punishment. 67 Further, immigrants
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65
Id.
66
See Lindskoog, supra note 1, at 143–44. See also JULIE A. DOWLING
& JONATHAN XAVIER INDA, GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 75
(Stanford Social Sciences, Mar. 27, 2013) (“in formally shifting toward this
more punitive response to unauthorized migration, the Department of Homeland
Security’s premise was that routing immigrants through the federal criminal
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See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997). See also id. at
373 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (“We should bear in mind that
while incapacitation is a goal common to both criminal and civil systems of
confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal
system alone.”).
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have historically been held in the same county jails and prisons that
are used to punish convicted criminals. 68
Since the 1980s, the number of private immigration
detention centers has boomed. 69 These detention centers are built
and administered by the same companies who build private prisons
for criminal incarceration. 70 Firsthand accounts of these facilities
show that the two are markedly similar. 71 Immigrants are often
handcuffed and shackled, forced to wear jumpsuits, deprived of the
ability to freely move around the facility, subjected to solitary
confinement, required to stand at attention for “count,” and unable
to access personal belongings or basic necessities. 72 Taking all these
factors into account, it remains unclear how the Court can so easily
distinguish immigration detention from punitive criminal detention.
This practical inability to review what other branches are doing
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perpetuates the systemic inequalities faced by unentered
immigrants.
Although Zadvydas is troubling in many ways, it did push
back on both the Court’s history of unwillingness to review
immigration cases and the IIRIRA statutes that attempt to strip the
Court of jurisdiction. 73 The Court overcame provisions that forbid
judicial review by stating that relevant case law suggests the
Constitution may preclude granting “an administrative body the
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating
fundamental rights.” 74 Justice Breyer did not limit this review
authority to statutorily granted rights, but instead wrote that there is
a serious constitutional problem when a statute permits an indefinite
“deprivation of human liberty,” suggesting this could potentially be
extended to unentered immigrants. 75
All in all, the Court’s decision in Zadvydas advanced
protections for certain categories of undocumented immigrants by
limiting how long the government can detain them pending removal
orders to six months. However, this holding excluded unentered
immigrants and resulted in a circuit split over whether this decision
ought to be expanded. 76
B. DHS v. Thuraissigiam
The most recent Supreme Court decision on this issue,
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, sent unentered
immigrants’ rights spiraling backwards and left many with a sense
of hopelessness for what is to come with the new makeup of the
Court. The Court’s right-wing justices (Roberts, Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, Thomas, and Alito) joined the majority with Justice
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Alito delivering the opinion of the Court. 77 Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, filed a concurring opinion, while Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented. 78
This case involved Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri
Lankan national who was apprehended 25 yards after crossing the
southern border. 79 Thuraissigiam was subsequently detained and
designated for expedited removal. 80 At the time of his arrest,
Thuraissigiam stated he had once been abducted and beaten and was
unsure whether the Sri Lankan authorities would protect him in the
future, but he did not fear persecution based on a characteristic that
justifies an asylum claim. 81 The asylum officer determined
Thuraissigiam lacked a “credible” fear as required by the asylum
statute, and Thuraissigiam filed a habeas petition claiming the
asylum officer did not follow the correct determination procedure. 82
The majority ultimately held that Thuraissigiam was not
entitled to due process protections because he was an unentered
immigrant seeking “initial admission,” and that the Court was
unable to review the merits of Thuraissigiam’s asylum claim due to
the IIRIRA jurisdiction stripping statute. 83 Alito dealt a huge blow
to unentered immigrants when he reaffirmed that Congress has the
right to admit or exclude aliens, and then went further to say that
“this rule would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as
an arriving alien set foot on U.S. soil.” 84 Alito compared unentered
immigrants to aliens arriving at an international airport on the
“threshold of initial entry.” 85
However, Thuraissigiam was not on the threshold of initial
entry. He was beyond the border and was not at a port of entry. He
had set foot on free U.S. soil, not at a checkpoint, not at a security
fence, but on unregulated U.S. soil. However, Justice Alito
dismissed his physical presence with ease, setting a potentially
77
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dangerous precedent that presence on U.S. soil (potentially
anywhere) does not matter for unentered immigrants. How far will
the majority’s logic expand? Is every unentered immigrant now on
the “threshold of entry” until they have been in the country for two
years? 86 While only a small portion of the overall opinion, this
paragraph has devastating potential for unentered immigrants. This
holding gives new energy to the entry fiction exception which has
the potential to reach far beyond the twenty-five yards from the
border where Thuraissigiam was apprehended.
Despite the implications of this opinion, Justice Sotomayor
seems to be one of the only justices who truly comprehends the
effects of the Court’s immigration jurisprudence. Sotomayor has
issued several scathing immigration dissents over the years, and this
one is par for the course. Sotomayor shreds the majority, charging
that the holding renders executive branch decisions to be
“functionally unreviewable through the writ of habeas corpus, no
matter whether the denial is arbitrary or irrational or contrary to
governing law.” 87 After all, if the Supreme Court—America’s
Temple of Justice—cannot review decisions or safeguard certain
individuals’ rights, then who can? Who can initiate a “check” on the
other two branches of government in this system of so-called checks
and balances? If Congress can abrogate constitutional rights by
defining people as being “outside” of the country despite the fact
that their physical bodies are within the borders, then what is the
purpose of having these rights at all? 88
Sotomayor characterizes entry fiction as “judicially
fashioned line-drawing [that] is not administrable” and lacks any
basis in the Constitution. 89 The entire premise of assuming that
those who have not entered the country legally should have the same
due process as those who have not entered the country at all is
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unsupported. 90 Sotomayor recognizes the broader implications of
drawing the line for due process at legal admission rather than
physical entry, denouncing the Court’s tethering of constitutional
protections to a noncitizen’s legal status. 91 What is to stop Congress
from redefining “entry” again and depriving more immigrants of
their rights to due process? 92
Fundamentally, it is out of step with how this Court
has conceived the scope of the Due Process Clause
for over a century: Congressional policy in the
immigration context does not dictate the scope of the
Constitution.
***
Taken to its extreme, a rule conditioning due process
rights on lawful entry would permit Congress to
constitutionally eliminate all procedural protections
for any noncitizen the Government deems
unlawfully admitted and summarily deport them no
matter how many decades they have lived here, how
settled and integrated they are in their communities,
or how many members of their family are U.S.
citizens or residents. 93
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The future implications of Thuraissigiam cannot yet be fully
understood. What is clear, however, is that this ruling sets the Court
on a dangerous trajectory back towards entry fiction and the blanket
denial of constitutional protections for unentered immigrants. The
majority in this opinion skews the history of the entry fiction
exception in a way that leaves it wide open for future expansion.
With a 6-3 supermajority, including three Trump appointees, the
prospects of meaningful jurisprudence in the area of undocumented
immigrants’ rights looks bleak—at best.
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